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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to offer an impression of the issues raised by the disclosure of companies’ tax 
information by supplying existing and historical viewpoints from the aspects of concepts, theory, constraints, 
benefits and measurements. We are concerned that full disclosure of organizations' tax information could result 
in firms weakening tax information, hampering tax enforcement, and maybe, in a weakened structure, disclosing 
private data that could give a competitive benefit to those organizations that are not requested to do such a 
disclosure. Hence, some studies do not underpin full disclosure. On the other hand, full tax disclosure could have 
numerous beneficial impacts. It might put pressure on regulators to develop the tax system and it might incite 
companies to oppose aggressive tax decrease strategies. We anticipate and expect interested parties to take into 
consideration the best practices of tax disclosure in implementing their future plans. 
Keywords: disclosure, tax disclosure, tax return, income tax 
1. Introduction and Background 
Pomp (1993) claimed that the issue of state company tax disclosure was raised in 1987 by a staff study for New 
York State's Legislative Tax Study Commission. Since this date, three states (Arkansas, Massachusetts, and West 
Virginia) have embraced regulations requiring some state-level disclosure by corporations. While Wisconsin has 
had a disclosure regulation since 1923, it has just as of late been utilized for tax policy purposes (Mazerov, 2007). 
Currently, activists around the globe call on governments to request disclosure of information for public users 
from companies about what, what amount and where on the globe firms, particularly multinational firms, pay 
taxes (Christians, 2013). Their point is to stir public thoughtfulness to the systemic under-taxation of 
multinational companies, to demonstrate that this is linked to the failure of development in developing countries, 
and to persuade law-makers that the public is curious in changing this model. In their mission for financial 
transparency through tax disclosure, activists are admitting themselves to an elite policy-making yard that has 
customarily been dominated by the political elites and seeking change. Tax transparency through applying tax 
disclosure norms challenges the tax policy standards developed within this yard, whilst the interest for activists 
in non-governmental organizations challenges the institutional foundations of contemporary worldwide tax 
policy-making (Christians, 2013). 
Furthermore, Christians (2013) argued that, during recent years, the global financial crisis has produced and 
coordinated rescue operations across the rich countries. Adverse effects on large financial interests and 
commercial sectors, together with high budget deficits and budget cuts, have led to growing public concern 
about poverty and global financial inequality. During this time period, however, several multinational companies 
announced record profits for their operations in all parts of the world, whilst seemingly escaping the charges 
(Reuters, 2011). In a same vein, Fenster (2011) said that the international tax transparency is an universal 
phenomenon versus this occurrence and backdrop. Tax transparency activists seek to ask and respond to the 
question: how is it that the globe’s biggest profit centers are contributing so little to public revenue needs 
especially in developing nations? This is the question posed by activists, with an emphasis on the search for 
information rather than a request for a change (Christians, 2013). It is by no means the initial time tax 
information has been sought with respect to firms in the U.S. or somewhere else. Pomp (1993) discussed the U.S. 
experience with the disclosure of corporate tax and the development of the national policy. 
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In the next section this paper illustrates a review of the literature and background of tax disclosure, which 
involves definitions of and discussions on tax disclosure in companies. The following section reviews and 
discusses the underlying theories and previous literatures of the theories that link to tax disclosure. Further 
analyses and review follow in sections three and four on the practice of efficient tax disclosure by revising 
objectives, boundaries, motivations, and advantages of tax disclosure. The fifth part of this paper reviews 
literature in the measurement of tax disclosure and, finally, the last part is concluded. 
2. Definitions of Tax Disclosure 
Mazerov (2007) argued that state companies’ income tax disclosure was broadly discussed in the early 1990s, 
when legislature in Massachusetts was amended to implement a disclosure regulation. To contribute to the 
Massachusetts discussion, Prof Pomp (Note 1) wrote a major report in 1993 on companies’ tax disclosure (Pomp, 
1993). Tax disclosures (TD) have been defined as a term utilized to depict two separate situations: “The first is 
the legal requirement to provide current taxation information to the other party. The second is related to 
transactions that may be viewed as tax sheltering that must be disclosed to the government when filing income 
taxes” (Francois, 2012, Para 1.2). 
Moreover, Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997) and Amir and Sougiannis (1999) found evidence that the 
independent disclosure of deferred tax liability (DTL) and deferred tax asset (DTA) components also supplies 
relevant information. Another merit of taxation disclosure that is worth mentioning is the provision of public 
access-by the disclosure of tax revenues in the U.S.-to annual income of tax exempt companies and the yearly 
reports of insurance firms. From the 1970s, the U.S. presidents have voluntarily disclosed their returns tax 
income publicly (OECD, 1999). 
Among the OECD countries Lenter, Shackelford, and Slemrod (2003), found that only Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
and Japan allow several forms of public access to taxation information. In Japan, taxable income figures are 
overtly liberated if the company reports more than forty Million Yen (around 332 thousand $) in taxable revenue. 
In 2000, nearly around 70 thousand companies recorded enough taxable returns to request disclosure. None of 
the components of taxable revenue (interest, cost of goods sold, revenues, and so on.) were made publicly 
obtainable. Taxable revenue is disclosed publicly for all Swedish firms, and Norway makes information on both 
tax liability and taxable income publicly available. However, if a corporation records a tax loss, the total of the 
loss is not recorded. Instead, the tax authorities disclose a zero amount of taxable revenue and none of the 
components of the taxable revenue are made available to the public access. On the contrary, Finland supplies 
open admission to a database containing information on natural capital, income tax, and the amount of taxes to 
be paid amongst other figures. Reconciliations between book numbers and tax are also disclosed publicly for 
Finnish firms (Lenter et al., 2003).  
Many researchers and practitioners expressed concern that Financial Interpretation No, (FIN) 48 disclosures 
supply a roadmap to the tax enforcement agents (Frischmann, Shevlin, & Wilson, 2008; Mills, Robinson, & 
Sansing, 2010). In accordance with IRS's Large & Midsized Business Field Examiners' Guide (2007), the 
disclosures required under FIN 48 must provide the service to some extent better inspection of a taxpayer’s 
uncertain tax positions; however, the disclosures are still not detailed enough to allow an ideal view of the issues 
and amounts at risk (Robinson & Schmidt, 2013). For instance, there may be a conditional tax liability listed in 
the tax footnotes of a big multinational taxpayer with the description “tax credits”; tax credits, however, could be 
the U.S., foreign, or state tax credits. Therefore, the “tax credits” in this instance may or may not in this case 
have the U.S. tax influence (IRS, 2007). While FIN 48 does not require the disclosure of information about exact 
operations, the level of tax reserves and disclosures concerning uncertain tax positions are utilized by 
enforcement agents to plan their own audits. Thus, managers have a motivation to supply lower tax reserves and 
low quality disclosures, since even the size of the reserve tax will be an indicator of tax planning and utilized by 
the IRS (Blouin, Gleason, Mills, & Sikes, 2010; Frischmann et al., 2008). 
Managers of companies who are using tax planning do not wish to disclose information about these activities 
(Gleason & Mills, 2002). In accordance with FIN 48, disclosures would be more expensive and costly for 
companies in tax planning. Frischmann et al. (2008) documented negative market responses to the release of FIN 
48, indicating that these reactions were based on the assumption that tax planning would be costly for the 
companies involved. This is because tax planning requires the integration of the institute with more staffing and 
increased budgets ( John, 2003). Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) postulated as an example that the 
expenditure of disclosure by companies with the largest tax planning ought to be higher. This is because 
companies that disclose tax information to the public undertake higher levels of tax planning and, as a consequence, 
owe increased amounts to the IRS, thus increasing the cost of disclosure (Gross, 2011). In order to avoid being 
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liable for large IRS fees, some investors avoid investing in companies with high levels of tax planning. Taxes and 
fees imposed by the IRS upon companies employing illegal tax avoidance measures can also increase the cost of 
disclosing tax information (Mills et al., 1998). Therefore, it could be costly for companies with higher levels of 
tax planning that have too much to hide and could get more control over their tax reserves (Sidhu & Whittred, 
2003). Hence, Gross (2011) expected that higher corporate tax planning offers decreased disclosure quality and 
lower tax reserves. 
3. Theories of Tax Disclosure 
There are a few theories, which discuss tax disclosure as a whole. Individual aspects of disclosure are examined 
in theories like political cost theory, signaling theory, and legitimacy theory. There are many reasons why 
companies provide or disclose differing levels of information, which are discussed below. 
3.1 Political Costs Theory 
Political costs “are costs that groups external to the company might be able to impose on the company as a result 
of political actions” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, p. 115). For instance, if a company accounts high returns, this 
might be utilized as a justification for lobby groups or trade unions to take action for an increased share of that 
return in the form of higher wages. Therefore, companies may use returns-reducing accounting methods (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1990). Furthermore, Deegan and Hallam (1991) gave another instance that may sustain political 
costs such as environmental factors like "carbon footprints". Disclosure made by a corporate in relative to their 
negative or positive influence on their physical environment might in addition be a technique to decrease any 
political costs. Political cost theory consequently can also make clear why many companies implement voluntary 
environmental and social disclosures in their yearly reports. Moreover, the political cost theory explains why 
other parties who want more information about the firm's tax policies and ask for increased levels of disclosure 
lead companies to adopt tax disclosure (Deegan & Hallam, 1991). Changes in accounting procedures are not 
costless to firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Accounting standard changes, which either raise disclosure or 
require corporations to change accounting methods, raise the firms’ book-keeping costs (including any necessary 
raises in cost in relation to disclosing information about taxes).  
The political sector has the authority to affect wealth transfers between numerous groups. Tax law is one factor 
affecting management wealth, but is not directly tied to financial accounting standards, with the exception of a 
few cases (e.g., the last-in-first-out). If management expects a suggested financial accounting process to impact 
future tax regulations, their lobbying behaviour is affected by the future tax regulation effects (Moonitz, 1974). 
Deegan and Hallam (1991) adopted a political cost perspective to voluntarily disclose value added statements in 
the yearly reports. Particularly, they hypothesized that value added statement disclosure is associated to labour 
intensity, company tax payments, rate of return, industry volatility, and company size. The study found that size 
(market concentration and absolute after tax profits), tax, and the industry to which a company belongs were all 
associated to the happening of value added statement disclosure. 
Political cost theory can assist in explaining the decisions of voluntary reporting (e.g. Leftwich, Watts, & 
Zimmerman, 1981). Considerations of political costs, such as taxes and regulation, and the determinants that 
affect the welfare of management assistance are to better understand the origin of the pressures that drive the 
development of accounting standards (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). The costs of contracting include agency, 
transaction, information, renegotiation, and bankruptcy costs, which are all crucial for the selection of 
accounting models (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
In contrast, managers have incentives to make a voluntary disclosure when the advantages outweigh the indirect 
and direct costs involved. Both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are to reduce the information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed market participants, and between the taxpayer and the IRS. Such information 
helps correct any errors of evaluation of the firm. As a result, they help to reduce the cost of capital for the firm 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), raise the demand of investors, reduce the bid-ask spread, and increase institutional 
interest and analytical following (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Li, Richardson, & Thornton, 1997). Sengupta 
(1998) indicated that the benefits of the cost of capital resulting from the disclosure of the quality of the cost of 
capital also extend to include the cost of debt capital. 
In summary, according to political cost theory, companies that are subject to high political costs (which highly 
relies on the size of the firm) are probably to supply and disclose further information about tax (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978). The political cost hypothesis states that large corporations, rather than small companies, are 
more likely to utilize accounting choices that decrease declared profits (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
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3.2 Signalling Theory 
In markets with information asymmetry, signaling theory states corporations issue "signals" about who they are 
and “what they believe” (Spence, 1973, p. 355). Spence (1974) defines market signals as altering the belief of, or 
conveying information to, other groups in the marketplace regarding some unobserved activity. Signaling 
information, therefore, is essential to decrease agency costs and information asymmetry between firms and the 
market. 
From another side, companies’ disclosures of information, including information about tax, falls somewhere 
between no disclosure and full disclosure, depending on their motivations (Premuroso, 2008). These motivations 
differ and have different effects on the level of disclosure between companies, and from one country to another. 
This is based on numerous factors, such as regulations, tax law, and political cost. All companies, at least 
partially, disclose information about their business prospects in order to signal whether they have or do not have 
good investment opportunities (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1980). 
Another possibility of using signaling theory is that managers may desire to decrease information asymmetry 
existing in the market regarding the company's performance. For instance, disclosures may serve as "signals" if 
they reflect information about unobservable attributes of a company's decision (Morris, 1989). In such a scenario, 
managers of higher quality firms with private information can distinguish themselves from lower quality 
companies via disclosures. In this context, managers can use tax disclosure to send signals to related parties that 
need information about tax in order to help them in their decisions. At the same time, managers of an 
underperforming firm may signal that the firm is taking steps to improve performance by disclosing a decision 
related to outsourcing. The finance literature tests company information disclosures using signaling theory in 
numerous ways. Ross (1977) contended that when managers possess inside information, the financial structure 
of the corporation (i.e. the amount of debt) signals information to the market. In another study, cash dividends 
functioned as a positive signal by the manager of expected cash flows when investors had imperfect information 
about companies’ profitability (Bhattacharya, 1979). Recent research also applied signaling theory to 
undervalued companies announcing stock repurchases to separate themselves from overvalued corporations 
(Utpal & Dittmar, 2003). In such scenarios, it is clear to see how companies can send signals under signaling 
theory to the users of information or financial statements. In the same context, tax information can be sent as 
signals to IRS or users through tax disclosure. 
In the case of asymmetric information, Akerlof (1970) who referred to the theory, suggested that firms with 
superior performance (good firms) utilize financial information (including tax information) to send signals to the 
market, users, and IRS. Therefore, managers can be motivated to provide or disclose specific information on a 
voluntary basis. This is because they are expected to supply (and to be interpreted as) a good indication of the 
performance of their companies in the market, and how to decrease the asymmetry of information. 
3.3 Legitimacy Theory 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, 
p. 574). A significant issue to be recognized is that there are, in fact, already two major categories of legitimacy 
theory. These are graphically reported in Figure 1. The “macro-theory” of legitimating, acknowledged as 
institutional legitimacy theory, deals with how organizational structures in their entirety (government for instance, 
or capitalism) have gained approval from society. “Within this tradition, legitimacy and institutionalization are 
virtually synonymous. Both phenomena empower organizations primarily by making them seem meaningful and 
natural” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). 
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Figure 1. Categories of legitimacy theory 
Source: Layers of Legitimacy Theory Refinements to legitimacy theory in social and environmental accounting, 
by Tilling, M, 2004, Commerce Research Paper Series, p. 3. 
 
This suggests that organizations constantly strive to ensure that they operate within the limits and rules of their 
respective societies. It is based on the idea that there is a social agreement between the company and the 
community, forcing the firm to voluntarily submit and disclose information on activities perceived as certain 
activities of the society (Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich, & Ricceri, 2004). From the viewpoint of legitimacy theory, 
information disclosure is used as a tool for companies to show that they operate according to the values of the 
society and are socially responsible, as well as providing a picture to get or maintain social legitimacy (Patten, 
1991, 2002). According to Guthrie et al. (2004) the theory of legitimacy is closely linked to disclosure of 
intellectual capital. Companies are more likely to report and disclose their assets as intangible if they have a 
specific need to do this and cannot legalize their status through "hard" assets that are recognized as a symbol of 
success in traditional companies (Guthrie et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, from the stakeholder tactic of analysis perspective, legitimacy theory is the interpretative lens of 
number of performance studies and environmental reporting that are disclosed by the companies. Legitimacy 
theory is utilized as an interpretation for company responses to intimidations to its legitimacy Vis-a-Vis the 
social agreement. Voluntary disclosures, fundamentally in yearly reports, are a communication mechanism by 
companies attempting to satisfy outer pressures to conform to socially satisfactory rules, substituting this 
communication technique for any substantive behavioural performance (Mobus, 2005). 
In summary, in view of previous literature of the related theories about tax disclosure, it can be concluded that 
political cost theory, signaling theory, and legitimacy theory are the theories that examine the relationship of tax 
disclosure and society. Political cost theory indicates the costs companies incur when they disclose information 
about their tax. Moreover, political cost theory also makes it easy to see why many companies approve voluntary 
environmental and social disclosures in their yearly reports (Deegan & Hallam, 1991). In contrast, signaling 
theory explains how firms can send signals to end users, shareholders, practitioners, and stakeholders, in the 
form of information in financial statements. Additionally, tax information can be sent as signals to IRS or any 
other parties requiring this information through tax disclosure (Utpal & Dittmar, 2003). Finally, theory of 
legitimacy is closely linked with the disclosure of intellectual capital. Consequently, companies are likely to 
report and disclose their assets as intangible if they have a specific need for this kind of disclosure (Guthrie et al., 
2004). 
4. Constraints and Objectives of Tax Disclosure 
4.1 Tax Disclosure Objectives 
The immediate aim of tax disclosure is to broaden general knowledge regarding the universal incomes obtained 
by the multinational companies (Brauner & Stewart, 2013). However, the ultimate goal is to stimulate popular 
movements of the tax reform as communities interact with the knowledge acquired. Activists aim to report as an 
experimental fact a universal financial settlement that systemically lets multinationals companies to escape 
taxation in roads that are expected and foreseeable, if not intentionally planned by lawgivers. Murphy (2011) in 
Country-by-Country Reporting (C-B-C-R) found that activists discovered that corruption and non-compliance by 
companies and the government is an advantage of this universal settlement, but this is not their merely, or even 
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elementary, concern. Alternatively, they attempted to reveal the lawful and institutional framework that permits 
multinational companies to avoid taxation in full acquiescence with all viable tax regulations. This is an 
extension of a large follow-up of the objectives of transparency beneath the ‘Publish What You Pay’ (PWYP) 
scheme. The purpose is to disclose cooperation between companies and governments that encourage corruption 
and non-compliance with tax legislations. Beneath C-B-C-R, the purpose is to disclose cooperation between 
companies and governments that promote under taxation of multinationals companies as an issue of systemic 
design (Christians, 2013). 
Proponents of transparency propose that several constituencies want to utilize the data collected throughout more 
inclusive requirements of tax disclosure to do best-informed market decisions (Christians, 2013). The primary 
intended audience for this tax translucence is investors, who would superficially have further data to invest in 
unsteady system of government, tax shelters, and other sensible regions (Murphy, 2011). In the U.S., giving 
shareholders admission to company tax information and making corporate tax returns public were features of 
early current company returns tax, which was quickly passed under pressure from the business lobbyists (Note 2) 
(Christians, 2013; Pomp, 1993). 
4.2 Constraints of Tax Disclosure 
Blank (2011) argued that boosted disclosed information about tax would give tax payers with both an inspiration 
and a road map to decrease their personal tax, whilst hindering the capacity of governments to preserve a picture 
of the tax scheme and providing a balanced tool for the rule of regulation. Furthermore, those in favour of more 
tax transparency (disclosure) argued that the disclosure of tax increases has little effect on compliance 
(Kornhauser, 2005; Mazza, 2003). An experience with better detection may supply a resource of information for 
needful analysis, however the modern overt discourse through tax transparency proposes that the dearth of 
empirical evidence will not obstruct powerful support on either aspect (Christians, 2013). 
According to the U.S. Treasury Department Secretary the SEC does not advantage from access to the company 
tax revenues as much information it yields is unrelated to the SEC. Neither would it be in the interest of the 
public to expose the proceeds of the tax on public companies, because the complexity would lead to confusion, 
with companies and individuals making "misinformed, inexpert analysis” (Lenter et al., 2003, p. 806). Likewise, 
the Treasury Department Secretary answered to the chairman of the Senate-Finance-Committee that there is a 
probable huge damage to both companies and government tax management if organizations’ tax portions or 
returns therefrom are made openly accessible (Lenter et al., 2003). However, different alternatives may enhance 
tax and financial statements: the Schedule M-l, which is filled with companies’ tax income, accounting income 
and reconciled tax, could be enhanced, the disclosure of tax information in financial reporting might be modified, 
and a number of the variations between tax accounting and book might be eliminated (Lenter et al., 2003). 
Lenter et al. (2003) argued that making firms’ tax returns publicly infringes the established rules of 
confidentiality that would produce misinformation and confusion about a company’s activities. Both of these 
issues are addressed below, along with a discussion of three other possible interceptions to the disclosure: one 
lawful, one depends on the fears of the government power, and one possibly unintended result. 
4.2.1 Disclosure of Tax Information Violation Confidentiality 
Public tax disclosure would break a key feature of the tax regulations: confidential tax information. Based on this 
view, a breach of privacy would be unwise for two causes. The initial reason that is linked to respect for 
compliance other than privacy is that the disclosure will lead firms to say less and thus pay less. The Tax 
Executives Institute (TEI) made this argument in its submission to the Treasury and the SEC, turning topsy-turvy 
the argument for disclosure on the basis of incremented acquiescence. It documented, that the field of data 
needed by the Internal-Revenue-Code is at once daunting and unusually delicate, and that the ability of 
tax-payers to reveal private data is reinforced by affirmations that their confidentiality benefits will be protected 
by the government (Note 3) (Lenter et al., 2003, p. 822). If a firm’s tax manager knows that the data they involve 
in the firm’s tax income will be publicly, the managers may withhold sensitive information. The tax liabilities of 
the company will then reduce, either directly through a simple understatement of tax returns or indirect as a 
consequence of the inability to accurately assess the IRS tax liability because of a lack of the required necessary 
information (Traubenberg, 2010). 
Other evidence is that the public disclosure of tax data would detect the valuable and contrary confidential 
business data to competing companies. In its statements to the Treasury and the SEC, the Tax Executives 
Institute (2002) showed instances of business items that are desired to be detected on tax income, and stated that, 
the items would provide a great advantage to competitors of the company. These items contain the sources, 
character, and nature of a firm's expenses and revenues, details about the firm's lawful structure, advertising, 
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licensing, sales, other selling expenses, leasing revenues by jurisdiction and lawful entity, and the environment 
and position of the firm's industrialization expenses by functional kind. If the information revealed is global, it 
might put a competitive benefit on those companies that have moderately significant proprietary data. Moreover, 
if the detection is not global, it could suggest a benefit to those firms that are not subject to the demands of 
disclosure. Generally, it would decrease the motivation to invest in acts whose return relies in portion on their 
nature of the proprietary data (Lenter et al., 2003). 
4.2.2 Tax Disclosure Could Create Confusion 
Public disclosure of a firm’s tax information as well alleged that those revenues are lengthy and complicated and, 
if disclosed, could cause confusion about a company’s activities, tax practices and accounting. According to, Tax 
Executives Institute (2002) considering the level and scope of variances in tax and financial accounting 
necessities, overt disclosure of organizations’ tax income poses extraordinary probable for befuddling rather than 
enlightening investors. In his response to the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the Treasury 
Department Secretary affirmed that they have genuine worries that overt disclosure of a big company’s income 
would result in major embarrassment amongst the public and would render the companies to misguided, 
unskilled analysis of their operating and finances exercises. Such “misanalysis” and perplexity can prompt 
unsubstantiated loss of confidence in the company, which might importantly (and improperly) harm that 
corporation's remaining amongst investors (Lenter et al., 2003, p. 824). 
4.2.3 Information to Government  
According to Lenter et al. (2003), another argument against the disclosure of a company’s tax information-not to 
the overt in general, however, the SEC and different agencies that making income accessible to government 
authorities outer the IRS will provide a previously influential federal bureaucracy an over the top measure of 
information to utilize versus tax-payers. The issue with this plea is that the additional data is presumably not 
significant. As described in the connection of business privacy, worries about confidentiality and government 
intervention have conventionally been raised against the disclosure of information about individual, not 
company’s data. This concentrate was surely the case in 1934. The confidentiality issues and worries raised by 
the disclosure of tax information when the individual becomes less resonant disclosure by companies are at issue 
(Lenter et al., 2003). 
4.2.4 Unintended Behavioural Responses to Disclosure 
Disclosure of a company’s tax increases the expense of performing business in a type that is liable to disclosure. 
For instance, disclosure is limited to corporations that are liable to SEC administrative supervision, that is, firms 
that are exchanged on open trades. Because no firms are traded on an open market presently disclose their tax 
income or important tax income data, it presumes that directors accept that the expenses of such disclosure 
surpass the advantages. If disclosure was mandated for public firms, several of them would choose to leave from 
the public capital markets, instead of disclose their tax data through tax disclosure. Such behaviour could 
subsequently increase the expense of acquiring capital (Lenter et al., 2003; Securities Commission Malaysia, 
2007, 2012). 
Likewise, if disclosure was restricted to tax income for companies (private and public), this could lead to 
reformation and liquidation of organizations as co-partnership or other inflow, that is, bodies that would not be 
liable to disclosure. Similarly, if disclosure was authorized for whole U.S. companies, the expense of being in the 
U.S. would raise compared with other nations. This raise could give a competitive benefit to outside firms and as 
a consequence firms would migrate out of the U.S. In brief, it is unattainable to authorize an entire tax income 
disclosure for all firms in the globe. Whether disclosure is expensive or not, a number of firms will react to 
disclosure by working on presumably and alternative suboptimal structures in respect to evade the requirement 
of disclosure (Lenter et al., 2003). 
4.2.5 Potential Obstacles among Tax Disclosure Costs 
Christians (2013) argued, however, that the requests of the market for information increases the likelihood that 
the flow of information may have unintended results on the behaviour of market entrants. In a short historical 
experience with the U.S. firm tax disclosure, the opponents of companies tax disclosure debated that publishing a 
company’s tax income failed to raise income, supported tax evasion (Ratner, 1980), and served to provide 
business competitors something of worth at the expense of the tax-payer. 
5. Benefits of Tax Disclosure 
Disclosures require companies to disclose greater tax-related detail. As known in the majority of countries, 
companies’ tax disclosure regulation does not supply policymakers and other users with enough information to 
www.ccsenet.org/ass Asian Social Science Vol. 11, No. 28; 2015 
8 
 
inform and motivate tax reform (FAST FACTS, 2007). When asking firms to disclose information regarding tax 
in details, there is a very important question that has been raised: why should a company’s tax income (or tax 
information) be disclosed? What are the motivations behind that? Public disclosure of a company’s tax income 
information will motivate and aid government regulators. Tax disclosures also motivate and develop the 
functioning of the financial markets. Tax disclosure motivates and promotes tax compliance and leads to and aids 
increased political pressure for better tax policy (FAST FACTS, 2007). 
Lenter et al. (2003) argued that high transparency of tax could have numerous helpful effects. First, tax 
disclosure can put pressure on regulators to develop the tax system. Second, tax disclosure may force companies 
to resist effective strategies to reduce tax planning. For example, if they fear that the disclosure of payments of 
lower tax would lead to negative reactions from the consumer’s response (where it causes the negative reaction 
of investors) responses are less clear, such as increasing transparency and stimulating the race to the bottom of 
the lower tax-liability. Third, it can contribute to improving the performance of financial markets, which 
highlights on the information contained in financial reports. Finally, disclosing information about tax in the 
financial reports of companies is more useful and beneficial to help investors understand the tax situation of the 
company and will provide public access to tax returns (Lenter et al., 2003). 
5.1 Measuring Companies’ Tax Loopholes 
One advantage of tax disclosure is that companies can illustrate the tax loopholes that permit very profitable 
companies to evade taxes. Two mainly problematic loopholes have been newly identified at the state level and 
can be addressed through a policy disclosure of information, which is good. The first one is the “Toys R Us-style 
loophole,” in which companies go from multi-state taxable income in high tax states to "passive income" and 
branches in countries with low or no taxes on corporate income. Therefore, Toys R Us was fundamentally 
moving income from non-taxing states to a taxing state. One way to disclose this loophole is to require 
companies tax disclosure of royalty payments to subsidiaries and interest (FAST FACTS, 2007). 
According to FAST FACTS (2007), multistate companies occasionally take benefit of tax state “nexus rules,” 
which set the standard as a "physical presence" of the company—there must be a state responsible for charges 
for a sales office in the region. One way to expose this gap or loophole is for companies who believe they have 
duties, in a particular case, to disclose why they should not be taxed on revenues from sales in the state. 
Tax disclosure helps companies by levelling the playing field. Generally, the comprehensive results of tax 
disclosure lead to a fairer tax system and more equitable tax that would improve the business environment 
anywhere by attracting many companies to countries with tax transparent and more tax disclosure. Because these 
policies tend to lead to the inspiration of the tax burden more equitably across companies, they offer the best 
disclosure and reveal information to new entrants and, more importantly, help to bridge loopholes that lead to 
these tax benefits. In addition, corporate tax disclosure leads to the public gaining more confidence in the 
company. Disclosure inevitably reveals that many of the companies pay their fair share of taxes, with a focus on 
good corporate citizenship (FAST FACTS, 2007). 
5.2 Tax Disclosure Motivate and Aid Government Regulators 
One argument of the rationales for making a company’s tax income publicly disclosed is to develop government 
legislation of companies. In this regard, making firm tax returns accessible to the SEC would aid government 
efforts to control corporate governance and to make sure that firms file the right financial statements. Two ideas 
support this contention. The first key idea is that companies need to be well controlled. Even though there is 
disagreement about how better to answer to the numerous current instances of organization wrongdoing, it is 
difficult to contradict that at some rank corporate governance performed weakly in several cases. The next key 
idea is that the information currently accessible to government legislator—both those officials occupied in 
administering the tax regulations and officials at the SEC—is ineligible, and companies’ tax income might act as 
a helpful instrument to government regulators in their efforts to regulate firms (Lenter et al., 2003). 
5.3 Develop Financial Markets Functioning 
The disclosing of companies’ tax return information would assist financial markets function further effectively 
by developing financial statements quality. This logic is, in a sense, a generalisation of the argument that it shall 
help the SEC in its goal of defending investors by regulating the impartiality of the market securities. Debatably, 
public detection of tax revenues levied on companies could aid the financial markets, even if it does not help the 
SEC (Kleinbard & Canellos, 2002; Lenter et al., 2003). 
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5.4 Tax Disclosure Motivate and Promote Tax Compliance 
Disclosure of companies’ information about income tax return decreases aggressive tax avoidance and outright 
evasion for two reasons (Lenter et al., 2003). Firstly, if company officials are worried that a firm’s taxable returns 
were revealed to be doubtfully low, the finding could produce an unfavourable public reply. Several firm 
officials might feel ashamed for being the officers of the firms exposed to be lesser than good companies' 
citizens. Further significantly, they fear an opposite influence on the firm's bottom-line since their business 
depends on their clients’ confidence that they are good public citizens (Lenter et al., 2003). 
The second reason, albeit less direct, is that the disclosure of information about corporate tax encourages 
increased compliance. Tax disclosure facilitates the reconciliation of the main differences between tax and book, 
either because the company itself provides these reconciliations or since reconciliations are computed by 
relevant parties, like the business journalism and academics. These reconciliations could help the IRS in 
discovering a company’s tax evasion. Accordingly, firms may be further irresolute to involve in aggressive tax 
planning (Lenter et al., 2003). For example, one may book an expanded tax reconciliation and shed light on the 
tax shelter transactions. In the context of the current policy, the process may not have been disclosed separately 
in the note of the tax balances (in a financial statement), as detailed in the Schedule M-l or not (Lenter et al., 
2003). 
5.5 Tax Disclosure Increases Political Pressure for Good Tax Policy 
The public tax disclosure of a company’s income tax returns will help raise political pressure for better tax 
approach and policy. Hanlon (2003) discussed that the information provided in the financial reports is not in 
general enough to pinpoint the company's payments or yearly tax liability. Disclosure would guarantee that a 
demonstrable and, to a certain degree, comparable number is in the public area. If a firm thinks that the disclosed 
number is misguiding with regards to its right tax status, it would have the chance of releasing additional 
descriptive information (Lenter et al., 2003). 
If this increases the responsiveness to change the general impression that the tax system is reasonable, there may 
be at least two possible advantages. Firstly, in a democracy, respect for regulations and management is good in 
and of itself, and depends on the legitimacy of the government in this respect. Secondly, it may be the public 
perception of justice that would raise voluntary compliance with tax legislations. Certainly, these arguments can 
be reversed if disclosure reduces public dependability on the fairness of the tax system or the perception that it 
safeguarded tax-payers' confidentiality (Lenter et al., 2003). 
5.6 Motives for Managers to Manipulate Reserves and Disclosures 
To reconcile the interests of managers with shareholders, managers get the equity incentives in the firm; this 
provides an incentive to reduce the cash outflows of tax (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). FIN 
48 restricted the efficiency of tax planning to the use of what has been disclosed and amounts reserved by the tax 
authorities. Blouin et al (2010) argued that if the managers of the companies think that the IRS will utilize the 
number of disclosed tax reserves, as above mentioned, as one of the several references for aggressive tax, they 
will favour to disclose lesser tax reserves. Poor disclosure shows that the managers are scared regarding how the 
IRS will be using their FIN 48 disclosures, that is, the amount of tax reserves. Consequently, companies with 
poor disclosure are encouraged to report lesser reserves. Several managers may have other motivations that are 
most significant to defend the positions of tax. For instance, they could preserve reserves as financial “cookie 
jars” to meet the covenants and debt, rewards, and thresholds or profit goals (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
5.7 Potential Advantages of Poor Disclosure Managers  
Managers will prefer to be less transparent in their disclosures since they think that these disclosures or 
statements could be utilized to undermine or weaken their status of tax and the expenditure of disclosure will 
outbalances the advantages. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) found that the market sets the value as less than the 
tax reserves of the companies with a high-goodness disclosure, which indicates that investors believe that poor 
disclosure assists managers to safeguard the tax centres. Hence, Gross (2011) expected that companies with poor 
disclosure of the information will pay less tax in their future cash flow. 
5.8 Potential Benefits of Excess Disclosure Managers  
Company managers with administrative capacity and a large tax reserve will have a motivation to supply 
disclosure if it gives truthfulness to their budgets and makes the company looks less aggressive. In accordance 
with Verrecchia (1983), companies decide to disclose if not the expense of disclosure outweighs the advantages. 
Proprietary costs contain any cost that decreases the current amount of cash flows. Li, Richardson, and Thornton 
(1997) applied proprietary cost theory to environmental disclosures showing Verrecchia’s (1983) partial 
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equilibrium holds for the expenditure of government investigations. Thus, managers must supply further 
disclosure of information if they believe the costs outweigh the advantages. Moreover, it is expected that 
managers provide additional disclosure of information to promote attitudes of the tax or limit the scope of tax 
audits (Gross, 2011). 
6. Measurements of Tax Disclosure 
Tax disclosure measurements are rarely tested by previous studies. The measurement should vary greatly 
depending on how data can be measured, the availability of data, and the interest of researchers in the general or 
specific approach to tax disclosure. Indices of disclosure are wide lists of certain disclosure items which are 
properly measured (depended on the objective criteria of usefulness in achieving the objectives of the user group) 
to measure the extent of disclosure (Marston & Shrives, 1991). As a self-constructed measure, the main obstacle 
is the subjective judgment engaged in the substructure of the index. Additionally Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
argued that difficulty happens in reproducing the analysis and making comparisons. Tax disclosure can be 
measured using an index of tax disclosure; empirical research on disclosure has been used as a tool to assess the 
quality and extent of information disclosed by companies, of both a voluntary and mandatory nature (Portela de 
Lima Rodrigues, Oliveira, & Craig, 2005). 
In the U.S. the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 109 discussed that the following disclosure 
items must appear in a company’s yearly financial reports: (i) the returns tax synopsis, which details the 
important components of returns tax expenditure, (ii) the rate reconciliation, reconciling presented returns tax 
cost with the amount that would come from applying the local federal statutory rate to pre-tax returns, and (iii) 
the schedule of deferred tax status, which supplies information regarding DTLs and DTAs (FASB, 1992). These 
three essential disclosures are in general reported in a tabular form. Companies in addition are predicted to 
disclose data about the amount and expiry dates of credit carry-forwards and loss, the division of tax expenditure 
between all other items and continuing operations, the composition of earnings before income taxes (total, local, 
and foreign), and temporary differences for which the company has not registered a deferred tax liability, 
counting permanently reinvested foreign earnings. In many cases, these additional disclosures are supplied in the 
text format (IRS, 2012). 
In addition, FIN 48 introduced instructions for measurement, the recognition, and required disclosures of 
doubtful tax advantages in financial statements. The FASB aims for measurement and the recognition of 
unrecognized tax advantages beneath FIN 48 to decrease variety in practice, and for the disclosure requirements 
to give more information about tax uncertainty (Robinson & Schmidt, 2013). The aim of FIN 48 is to provide 
consistent guidance for the recognition of these unknown tax advantages in financial reports when any likely tax 
disputes remain unresolved. According to introduced the guidelines of FIN 48, constituents anticipate that the 
FIN 48 disclosures would entail some of items in the financial statement. 
Similarly, Koester (2011) argued that FIN 48 supplies recognition threshold and measurement attributes for 
financial report measurement and recognition of the status of the taxes. Recognition threshold requires that it is 
further probably than-not that a tax status will continue upon audit. The threshold depends only on the technical 
advantages, assuming the position of the authority of taxation has all the related data, and ignoring the possibility 
of the audit. Characteristic of measurement is the biggest number of advantage that has a probability of more 
than 50 per cent likelihood of being recognized upon settlement. The resulting unrealized tax advantage is 
registered as a conditional liability. FIN 48 applies merely doubtful tax status and does not modify to another 109 
SFAS deferred tax accounting and the utilize of the evaluation allowance account for deferred tax assets. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper discussed some studies and conclusions with a summarised overview of the associated literature 
related to tax disclosure in order to verify the gaps in the current body of knowledge. Obviously, tax disclosure is 
relatively a new area of corporate reporting research, and there is a limitation in previous literature this one of 
the big difficulties in researching this topic. In summary, by definition, offering disclosure implies that some data 
that is presently confidential becomes public. However, it is believed that there is no constitutional obstruction to 
forging the confidentiality of this data, and hence the case should be made on base of whether or not there are 
substantial advantages. This case has been found to be compulsory and we can look forward to the following 
step of bearing in mind the most excellent position of tax disclosure and its implementation details (Lenter et al., 
2003). The movement of tax transparency seems to prove the basis, as other initiatives to reform tax policies do 
not have that compression on the system and should be used from the outside. It is indicated that the movement 
currently engages individuals and the leaders in the management of fiscal policy could not be relied upon to 
focus on the distribution of tax burdens in an appropriate manner with wider social values. It remains to be seen 
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whether the awakening public attention to international tax planning will lead to enough attention to the 
imposition of a political shift. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Prof Pomp from University of Connecticut School of Law. 
Note 2. This is according to “44 Congress Rec. 4000 (1909) (Senate debate in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 
1909, the predecessor of the current U.S. corporate income tax system); Pomp supra note 5 at 387-388 
(discussing the efforts of the Illinois Manufacturing Association to prevent company tax disclosure)”. 
Note 3. Tax Notes Today by TEI. TEI message to Treasury, SEC on Companies Disclosure. 143 (July 25, 2002): 
22. 
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